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The   acknowledgement   that   many   vulnerable   societies   relapse   into   violence   in   the  
aftermath  of  the  withdrawal  of  peacekeeping  operations  has  underscored  the  imperative  
of   developing   sustainable   exit   strategies.   Stabilization   has   hence   emerged   as   a   possible  
means  to  promote  short-­‐‑term  security  while  avoiding  direct  political  responsibility  over  
complex  crises,  but  the  meaning  of  the  term  and  its  consequences  remain  disputed.  The  
aim  of   this   contribution   is   to   examine   the   conceptual,   academic   and  diplomatic   debate  
over  the  concept  of  stabilization  in  peace  operations  by  addressing  the  case  of  the  United  
Nations   Mission   for   the   Stabilization   of   Haiti   (MINUSTAH),   and   Brazil’s  
multidimensional  role  in  it.  
In   February   2011,   when   presiding   over   the   United   Nations   Security   Council  
(UNSC),  Brazil  drafted  a  Presidential  Statement  on  the  interdependence  between  security  
and   development   for   the   maintenance   of   international   peace   and   security  
(S/PRST/2011/4).   In   2005,   the   issue   had   received   special   treatment   in   the   UN   system,  
namely  when  the  UN  Peacebuilding  Commission  (PBC)  was  created  alongside  with  the  
recognition  of  a  conceptual  and  empirical   range   for  peace   that  could  only  be   translated  
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into   actual   security,   or   the   settlement   of   threats,   if   perceived   via   a   multidimensional  
strategy.  
                   Brazilian  Foreign  Policy  had  long  advocated  the  inclusion  of  development  among  
debates   on   international   security,   but   recently   the   country   broadened   its   grasp   of  
development,  inserting  not  only  criticisms  of  wealth  concentration  and  the  urge  to  social  
justice,   industrialization   and   macroeconomic   stability   (Kalil,   2012).   Brazil   has   come   to  
terms  with  the  unstable  realities  of  the  aftermath  of  the  Cold  War,  in  which  the  interlink  
between   development   and   security   is   evidenced   by   the   need   to   generate   electricity,  
improve   infrastructure   and   establish   transparent   legal   systems   to   attract   investors   and  
provide   job   opportunities   in   order   to   tackle   the   roots   of   conflict.   Having   acquired   the  
status  of  an  emerging  power  based  on   its  macroeconomic   stability  and   the   inclusion  of  
millions   into   the   middle   class   within   a   highly   urban   society,   Brazil   was   now   able   to  
engage  in  international  security  issues  in  a  less  self-­‐‑concerned  way.  
                   Although  Brazil’s  military  might  remains  only  moderate,  the  country  now  engages  
in   international   defense   cooperation   in   light   of   its   economic   and  political   stability.   The  
democratic   aggiornamento   of   Brazilian   armed   forces   was   underscored   by   official  
documents  such  as  the  National  Defense  White  Book,  the  National  Defense  Strategy  and  
the  National  Defense  Policy.  It  would  be  tantalizing  to  downplay  such  involvement,  since  
the  former  metropolises’  or  the  Western  States’  military  outreach  –  or  even  that  of  Russia  
and  China  –  are  substantially  more  ambitious   than  Brazil’s.  Nonetheless,  here  might   lie  
one  of  Brasília’s  key  contributions   to  conceptual  and  theoretical   thinking  regarding  war  
and  peace:   the  possibility   of   furthering  national   interests   through  military   involvement  
while  actually  promoting  security  and  prosperity  for  the  local  population.  There  could  be  
a   voluntary   positive   sum   between   defending   geopolitical   objectives   and   fostering   a  
sustainable  peace  in  fragile  contexts.  Without  disregarding  the  political  selectivity  behind  
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the  UNSC  decisions  on  matters  of  peace  and  security,  the  international  community  could  
actively  engage   in  peacekeeping  operations   that  might  be  more   successful   in   creating  a  
sustainable  peace   -­‐‑   as   long   as   certain   approaches   to   the   concepts   of   peacebuilding   and  
stabilization  are  clearly  identified  within  the  scope  of  the  resolution.    
                   Brazil’s  military   leadership  of   the  United  Nations  Mission  for   the  Stabilization  of  
Haiti   (MINUSTAH),   as   this   article   discusses,   faces   dilemmas   that   are   familiar   to   other  
contributors  of   troops   to  peacekeeping  operations,   in  Haiti  and  elsewhere.  Nonetheless,  
the   way   the   country’s   military   personnel   deal   with   such   challenges   suggest   a   unique  
strategy,  be  it  voluntary  or  not.  The  launching  of  projects  such  as  Light  and  Security  in  Cité  
Soleil   and   the   choice   of   intoning   the   Haitian   anthem   before   a   raged   riot   instead   of  
resorting  to  pure  use  of  force,  even  though  the  latter  course  of  action  would  be  authorized  
by   the   mission'ʹs   mandate,   illustrate   how   Brazil’s   agency   in   issues   that   encompass   the  
tools   of  Hard   Politics  manages   to   fuse   hard   and   soft   power   in  what   transcends  Nye’s  
(2004)  synthesis  of  a  smart  power.    
The   2011   Brazilian   interpretation   of   the   interdependence   between   security   and  
development  finds  in  Haiti  its  concrete  expression  in  terms  of  the  successful  provision  of  
a  sustainable  peace  –  or  perhaps  stability.  The  Brazilian  Battalion’s  slogan  ‘Strong  Arms;  
Friendly  Hands’  epitomizes  such   transcendence.  The  phrase   illustrates   the   fundamental  
construction   of   a   safe   environment   through   the   actual,   imminent   or   dissuasive   use   of  
force.   Besides,   it   affirms   that   such   involvement   would   carry   within   itself   the  
responsibility  of  offering  a  positive  experience  regarding  what  should  represent  a  brand  
new   chapter   in   the   population’s   perception   and   trust   in   institutions.   Yet,   the   slogan  
conveys  the  idea  that  Nye’s  (2004)  soft  and  hard  powers  could  gather  to  represent  more  
than  the  smart  power,  but  an  actual  overlap  between  the  exercise  of  influence  via  cultural  
features,  political  values,  foreign  policy,  capital  and  guns.  Brazil’s  Foreign  Policy  has  been  
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largely  successful  in  portraying  the  image  of  a  global  player  with  a  particular  role  in  Latin  
America  and  in  peace  and  security.    
Brazil’s  cultural  traces  and  political  values,  in  turn,  represent  an  asset  to  deal  with  
Haiti’s   local   realities.   Brazilian   economic   vigour   also   provided   the   country   with  
capabilities  to  exert  real  influence  especially  in  the  field  of  cooperation  for  development  -­‐‑  
a  fact  which  represents  an  international  benchmark  in  light  of  Brazil’s  political  values  and  
socially  inclusive  domestic  policies.  The  military  presence  in  Haiti,  thus,  could  represent  
the  embodiment  of  most  of  Brazil’s  agency  in  the  international  arena.    
In  this  sense,  Brazil’s  domestic  reality  may  be  a  useful  laboratory  for  the  country’s  
diplomacy.  As  citizens  of  a  former  colony  and  a  developing  nation,  Brazilians  are  used  to  
corruption  scandals  and  confusions  between  the  public  and  the  private  spheres.  This  was  
intensified   by   a   late   industrialization   process   and   a   rather   recent   development   of  
democratic   institutions,   including   the   Constitution   itself,   which   is   only   26   years   old  
(Braveboy-­‐‑Wagner,  2003).  Such  a  recent  institutional  maturing  allowed  the  Brazilian  state  
to  be  conscious  of  realities  that  resemble  that  of  fragile  states,  while  having  surpassed  dim  
predicaments,  especially  in  the  twenty-­‐‑first  century.  Indeed,  an  interview  with  a  Brazilian  
military  during  a  night  patrol  in  Cité  Soleil  has  revealed  how  a  soldier  born  and  raised  in  
Rio  de   Janeiro  understands   the  dynamic  of   the   largest  Haitian   slum.  On  record,  he  did  
not  hesitate  to  argue  that  Cité  Soleil  would  be   just   like  any  other  favela  in  Rio.  The  only  
differences  were  Haiti’s  extreme  poverty  and  some  cultural  quirks  such  as  the  importance  
of  not  asking  men  to  take  of  their  shirts  during,  for  instance,  a  security  check.    
Measuring   or   even   considering   cultural   elements   as   capabilities   is   a   Herculean  
task,  and  one  that  is  not  going  to  be  the  core  preoccupation  of  this  article  (Kalil,  Hamman,  
Muggah,  2012).  Nonetheless,  the  Brazilian  approach  to  peacebuilding,  particularly  in  the  
context  of  MINUSTAH,  will  be  contrasted  with  controversial  agendas  of  stabilization  that  
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were   stealthily   put   forward   by   certain   developed   countries   at   the  United  Nations.   The  
broader  academic  debate  over  the  concept  of  stabilization  will  also  be  addressed.    
The  main  goal  of  this  contribution  is  thus  to  address  the  interdependence  between  
security   and   development   within   the   emerging   concept   of   stabilization   based   on   the  
United  Nations’  experience   in  Haiti   from  2004  until  2014,  as  well  as  Brazil'ʹs   role   in   this  
enterprise.  We  will  examine  the  current  concepts  and  doctrines  (or  lack  thereof)  regarding  
the  notions  of  “stability”  and  “stabilization”  within  the  UN.  Literature  on  the  concept  of  
stabilization  will  be  used,  besides   such  primary   sources  as  UN  documents,   reports  and  
data,   as   well   as   field   research   undertaken   by   both   authors   in   several   Haitian   cities   in  
December   2014   that   included   visits   to   local   communities   and   development   projects,   as  
well  as  interviews  with  diplomats,  Haitian  citizens  and  international  military,  police  and  
civilian  personnel,  especially  those  under  the  guise  of  MINUSTAH.  Chatham  House  rules  
were  assured  to  those  interviewed,  thus  offering  them  a  safe  environment  to  address  not-­‐‑
that-­‐‑comfortable  issues  related  to  the  current  and  future  challenges  faced  by  peacekeepers  
in   the   country.   Also,   theoretical   background   is   to   be   taken   into   account,   such   as  
Campbell’s   (1992),   Tickner’s   (2002),   Weber’s   (2005)   and   Bilgin’s   (2011)   input   on  
securitization.  
                   A  key  question  this  article  intends  to  ask  is  whether  stabilization  has  been  practiced  as  
a   form   of   securitized   peacebuilding,   and  MINUSTAH   provides   relevant   empirical   data   to    
investigate   this   claim.   Bensahel,   Oliker   &   Peterson   (2009),   Muggah   (2009;   2014),   Mac  
Ginty  (2012)  and  Coning,  Muggah  &  Cunliffe  (2014)  present  key  debates  on  the  rise  of  the  
concept  of  stabilization  within   the  UN  system.  Their  contributions  should  entail   further  
research  on  the  shifting  political  usage  of  these  concept  by  the  permanent  members  of  the  
Security   Council   (P5),   particularly   the   United   States,   in   light   of   factors   such   as   the  
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evolution  of  public   opinion   and   the   interests   of   bureaucratic   civil   services  within   these  
countries.  
Clearly,   political   will   is   paramount   for   any   type   of   change.   New   and   more  
sustainable  approaches  to  peacekeeping,  possibly  to  be  proposed  by  the  UN  High  Level  
Independent   Panel   on   Peace   Operations   in   September   2015,   could   move   beyond  
traditional  discussions  on   the   legitimacy  of   international   interventions  and  have  special  
relevance  for  the  practices  of  a  highly  politicized  and  selective  UNSC.  Conceptual  debates  
on   the  uses  of   stabilization  should  encompass  not  only   the   limits  and  opportunities   for  
the  use  of  force,  but  above  all  an  understanding  of  the  level  of  international  interference,  
including   through   military   means,   to   be   deemed   acceptable   and   legitimate   by   the  
countries  and  societies  involved.  
The  first  part  of  this  article  carries  the  current  application  of  the  term  stabilization  
in  peacekeeping  operations  under  the  umbrella  of  the  United  Nations,  as  well  as  in  other  
debates   within   the   organization,   such   as   that   involving   the   Post-­‐‑2015   Development  
Agenda.   This   will   raises   the   question   of   whether   stabilization   is   the   revalidation   of  
traditional   strategies   under   the   justification   of   better   intentions   regarding   the  
sustainability  of  peace.  
Brazilian  Foreign  Policy  both  in  discourse  and  practice,  especially  in  the  landscape  
of  MINUSTAH,  is  addressed  in  the  second  part  of  this  article.  The  country’s  perspective  
on   the   interdependence   between   security   and   development   spills   over   to   an  
understanding  of  peacekeeping  and  peacebuilding  as  necessarily  concomitant  in  the  field  
of  fragile  contexts.  As  we  will  see,  Brazil  challenges  the  notion  that  holds  stabilization  as  a  
separate   -­‐‑   and   even   rival   -­‐‑   endeavor  within   the  wider   efforts   of   peacebuilding.   In   the  
third   and   final   part   of   this   contribution,   we   will   examine   the   stabilization   and  
peacebuilding  activities  led  by  Brazil  in  Haiti  while  seeking  clues  on  how  the  concept  of  
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stabilization  may  be  designed  to  encompass  a  long-­‐‑term  and  multidimensional  approach  
to   sustainable   peace   that   is   based   on   a   true   commitment   to   a   broad   peacebuilding  
strategy,  rather  than  a  limited  and  circumstantial  military  engagement.      
                       
An  elusive  and  controversial  concept  
  
The   politically   loaded   concepts   of   stability   and   stabilization   remains   ill-­‐‑defined   in   the  
ever-­‐‑growing   literature   on   international   peacebuilding   and   statebuilding.   It   has   been  
argued  that  stabilization  differs  from  peacekeeping  in  that  it  attempts  to  “achieve  peace  
by  managing  or  removing  an  aggressor”,  while  the  aim  of  peacekeeping  is  “to  arrive  at  
and  maintain   a   cease-­‐‑fire   and/or   implement   a   peace   agreement   among   the   parties   to   a  
conflict”  (Coning,  Muggah,  Cunliffe,  2014).  According  to  another  definition,  stabilization  
constitutes   “a   ‘transition’   from   large-­‐‑scale  peacekeeping  operations   in   areas   affected  by  
widespread  insecurity  to  smaller-­‐‑scale  program  with  targeted  security  and  development  
packages”   (Muggah,   2014).   Other   authors   have   deemed   “stabilization   forces”   a   mere  
synonym  for  “peace  support  operations”  with  robust  implementation  mandates  (Chetail,  
2009).  
Most   Western   official   doctrines   contain   wide-­‐‑ranging   definitions   on   these  
controversial  words.  The  United  States  Institute  of  Peace  sees  stability  as  “the  tendency  of  
a   state   or   a   nation   to   recover   from   perturbations   and   resist   sudden   change   or  
deterioration”  and  stabilization  as  “ending  or  preventing  the  recurrence  of  violent  conflict  
and  creating  the  conditions  for  normal  economic  activity  and  nonviolent  politics”  (USIP,  
2009).  Also  from  a  US  strategic  perspective,  the  Rand  Corporation  describes  stabilization  
as   “the   effort   to   end   conflict   and   social,   economic   and   political   upheaval”,   and   one  
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component   of   a   wide   range   of   operations   that   may   include   counterinsurgency,  
counterterrorism  and  reconstruction  (Bensahel,  2009).  
Current  NATO  doctrine  states  that  stabilization  and  reconstruction  activities  entail  
”support  to  establishing  long-­‐‑term  stability  and  strengthened  governance,  local  capacity  
building   and   the   promotion   of   ownership   by   the   relevant   national   authorities,  
encouragement   of   the   rule   of   law   and   establishing   the   basis   for   economic,   human   and  
social   development”   (NATO,   2011).   The   UK   Ministry   of   Defence   understands  
stabilization   as   “the   process   that   supports   states   which   are   entering,   enduring   or  
emerging  from  conflict  in  order  to:  prevent  or  reduce  violence;  protect  the  population  and  
key  infrastructure;  promote  political  processes  and  governance  structures  which  lead  to  a  
political  settlement  that  institutionalizes  non-­‐‑violent  contests  for  power;  and  prepares  for  
sustainable   social   and   economic   development”,   adding   that   “its   ultimate   purpose   is   to  
strengthen  an  existing  political  order,  or  to  reshape  it,  to  become  more  acceptable  to  that  
nation’s   population   and   more   consistent   with   the   UK’s   strategic   interests”   (UKMOD,  
2009).  
But   detractors   of   these   forceful   definitions   are   legion,   most   of   whom   are   also  
skeptical   about   the   effects   of   the   so-­‐‑called   “liberal   peace”   (Paris,   2009,   Chandler,   2010,  
Campbell,  2011),  comprising  Western-­‐‑inspired  institution-­‐‑building  and  policymaking,  on  
fragile  or  post-­‐‑conflict  scenarios.  Mac  Ginty  offers  a  particularly  relentless  critique  on  the  
political   usage   of   stabilization,   pointing   out   the   complications   regarding   the   chosen  
indicators   and   the  means  of   applying   such   surveys,  but   especially   the   emphasis  on   the  
protection  against  crime  and  violence  instead  of  other  preoccupations  that  would  be  more  
urgent   to   the   concerned   population.   As   the   author   underscores:   “The   ascent   of  
stabilization  needs   to  be  examined  within   the  wider   context  of   the   securitization  of   aid  
and   peace-­‐‑support   intervention”   (Mac   Ginty,   2012).   The   author’s   understanding   of  
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securitization   slightly   differs   from   that   of   other   thinkers,   as   he   states   it   would   be   ‘the  
prioritization   of   security   and   the   security   lens,   especially   in   the   development   and   aid  
spheres  where   traditionally  notions  of  empathy  and  moral  compassion  held  sway   (Mac  
Ginty,  2012)’.  Campbell’s  (1992),  Tickner’s  (2002),  Weber’s  (2005)  and  Bilgin’s  (2011)  input  
on  securitization  brush  up  the  idea  by  grasping  it  as  the  recognition  of  a  threat  to  one’s  
own  security.  Hence,  the  action  based  on  the  securitization  of  a  reality  would  offer  fertile  
ground   to   the   politicization   of   events.   When   stability   choses   the   securitized   path   of  
peacebuilding,   it   would   fall   into   this   category,   what   can   be   rather   useful   to   a   not-­‐‑so-­‐‑
democratic  UNSC.    
Likewise,   Curtis   argues   that   stabilization   (“order   through   coercion   and  military  
power”)   is   the  most   conservative   framework   for  peacebuilding,  as  opposed   to   the   rival  
approaches  of  peacebuilding   as   liberal   governance   (developing   the   state   and   its   formal  
institutions,  including  electoral  democracy  and  a  free  market)  and  peacebuilding  as  social  
justice   (empowering   vulnerable   actors   and   tackling   inequality   within   and   between  
countries)   (Curtis,   2013).  Given   such  debate,   the   next   part   of   this   chapter   offers   a   brief  
history  of  the  treatment  of  stabilization  in  the  United  Nations  political  practices.    
    
Stability,  stabilization  and  the  United  Nations  System  
  
While   Kofi   Annan’s   2005   report   In   Larger   Freedom   effected   direct   results   within   the  
structure   of   the  United  Nations,   including   the   establishment   of   the   PBC,   an   influential  
2009  document  launched  by  the  Department  of  Peacekeeping  Operations  (DPKO)  and  the  
Department  of  Field  Support  (DFS)  (United  Nations  Peacekeeping  Operations:  Principles  and  
Guidelines,   known   as   the   “Capstone   Doctrine”)   renewed   the   multilateral   conceptual  
debate   on   peacekeeping   and   its   contemporary   challenges.   Evidently   informed   by  
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developments  on  the  ground,  and  in  particular  the  debacles  of  Rwanda,  Bosnia,  Somalia  
and   the   two  Congo  wars,   these  discussions  dated  back   to   the  milestone  1992   report  An  
Agenda   for   Peace   and   the   subsequent   controversy   on   the   legitimacy   of   humanitarian  
intervention  that  ultimately  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  concept  of  Responsibility  to  Protect  
by  the  2005  World  Summit.  
                   Yet  this  intellectual  tour  de  force  omitted  any  meaningful  definition  of  the  words  
“stability”   and   “stabilization”   in   the   context   of   peacekeeping   operations   and   related  
endeavors.  The  glossary  of   the  Capstone  Doctrine  noticeably  fails   to  define  these  terms,  
even  if  the  document  contains  a  graph  vaguely  suggesting  that  stabilization  might  be  the  
initial  phase  of  a  peace  consolidation  effort,  when  post-­‐‑conflict  tasks  in  twelve  extremely  
varied   areas   (infrastructure;   employment;   economic   governance;   civil   administration;  
elections;   political   process;   security   operations;   disarmament,   demobilization   and  
reintegration   [DDR];   rule   of   law;   human   rights;   capacity   building;   and   humanitarian  
assistance)  could  be  fostered  by  the  United  Nations  and  its  partners.  
In   many   ways,   stabilization   might   therefore   be   the   missing   link   of   the   conceptual,  
academic  and  diplomatic  debate   regarding  UN  peacekeeping   since   the  end  of   the  Cold  
War.  
In   spite   of,   and   perhaps   because   of,   this   terminological   vacuum,   the   Security  
Council   has   authorized   no   less   than   five   peacekeeping,   peace-­‐‑enforcement   or  
peacebuilding  operations  bearing  the  word  “stabilization”  in  their  titles  in  recent  decades  
–  the  NATO-­‐‑led  Stabilization  Force  in  Bosnia  (SFOR,  1996)  and  the  UN  missions  in  Haiti  
(MINUSTAH,  2004),  the  Democratic  Republic  of  the  Congo  (MONUSCO,  which  replaced  
MONUC  in  2010),  Mali  (MINUSMA,  2013)  and  the  Central  African  Republic  (MINUSCA,  
2014).  
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The   specific   security   challenges   facing   these   five   operations   were   in   fact   very  
dissimilar,  and  the  same  could  be  said  about  their  respective  political  contexts.  In  the  case  
of  SFOR,  "ʺstabilization"ʺ  meant  the  forceful  implementation  of  a  peace  agreement  (the  1995  
Dayton   Accords);   otherwise   said,   the   NATO-­‐‑led   mission   was   essentially   a   fortified  
version  of   a   traditional  peacekeeping  operation,   as   it  was  meant   to   separate  belligerent  
parties  with  their  consent  on  the  aftermath  of  a  war.  MINUSTAH,  on  the  other  hand,  was  
deployed  to  a  country  with  no  armed  conflict  and  actually  deprived  of  a  standing  Army;  
the   "ʺenemy"ʺ   to   be   vanquished  was   the   very  weakness   of   the  Haitian   state   and   society,  
struck   by   both   political   fragility   and   economic   and   environmental   vulnerability  
(GAUTHIER,  2010).  When  establishing  MINUSTAH  through  Resolution  1542  (2004),  the  
Security  Council  explicitly  stated  that  the  “challenges  to  the  political,  social  and  economic  
stability  of  Haiti”  posed  a  threat  to  international  peace  and  security  in  the  region.  Lastly,  
the   three   stabilization   missions   launched   in   Africa   since   2010   were   attempts   to   solve  
highly  complex  crises,  where  long-­‐‑running  domestic  conflicts  were  aggravated  by  chronic  
underdevelopment  and  the  insufficient  legitimacy  and  effectiveness  of  concerned  states,  
often  the  heirs  of  artificial  colonial  entities.  The  case  of  MINUSMA,  in  particular,  should  
also   be   understood   through   the  prism  of   the   so-­‐‑called   "ʺwar   on   terror"ʺ,   as   the   northern  
region   of  Mali   (the  Azawad)   had   effectively   seceded   and   hosted   a  multitude   of   Saheli  
jihadist   groups   between   2012   and   2013,   a   fact  which   led   to   frequent   comparisons  with  
Afghanistan  under  Taliban  rule.  
Additionally,   the  objectives  of  “stabilization”  and  “stability”  have  been  raised  by  
the   resolutions   that   established   missions   in   Kosovo   (UNMIK,   1999),   Sierra   Leone  
(UNAMSIL,  1999),  Liberia  (UNMIL,  2003  –  explicitly  defined  as  a  “stabilization  force”  by  
its   mandate),   Côte   d’Ivoire   (UNOCI,   2004),   Timor-­‐‑Leste   (UNMIT,   2006),   South   Sudan  
(UNMISS,   2011)   and   Abyei   (UNISFA,   2011),   as   well   as   UN-­‐‑authorized   multinational  
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forces   in   Afghanistan   (ISAF,   2001)   and   Somalia   (AMISOM,   2007),   respectively   led   by  
NATO   and   the   African   Union.   Even   UN   special   political   missions,   wholly   civilian   in  
nature   and   linked   to   the   Department   of   Political   Affairs   instead   of   the   Department   of  
Peacekeeping  Operations,  have  resorted  to  the  ambiguous  language  of  stabilization,  as  in  
Guinea-­‐‑Bissau   (UNIOGBIS,   2009),   Burundi   (BNUB,   2010),   Libya   (UNSMIL,   2011)   and  
Somalia  (UNSOM,  2013).  
While   the  actual   approaches  of   these  missions  vary  widely,   a   singularly   relevant  
case   is   the   robust  mandate   guiding  MONUSCO   since   2013,  when   the   Security  Council  
authorized  an  Intervention  Brigade  able  to  employ  offensive  action  to  “neutralize  armed  
groups”  in  eastern  Congo  and  decided  to  pursue  “stabilization  through  the  establishment  
of   functional   state   security   institutions   in   conflict-­‐‑affected   areas,   and   through  
strengthened   democratic   order   that   reduces   the   risk   of   instability,   including   adequate  
political  space,  observance  of  human  rights  and  a  credible  electoral  process”  (SCR  2098).  
MONUSCO  military  action  was  to  be  complemented  by  a  complex  framework  of  civilian  
activities,   including  an   International  Security  and  Stabilization  Support  Strategy   (ISSSS)  
to   gather   resources   to   strengthen   state   control   over   eastern   DRC;   a   government-­‐‑led  
Stabilization  and  Reconstruction  Plan  (STAREC);  and  the  innovative  concept  of  “islands  
of   stability”,   fragile   areas   where   MONUSCO  would   help   government   forces   restoring  
authority  through  the  delivery  of  basic  public  services  –  from  hospitals  to  police  stations  –  
and   the   physical   denial   of   presence   for   rebel   groups.   This   civilian-­‐‑military   initiative  
echoes   the   counterinsurgency   model   applied   by   NATO   during   its   2009-­‐‑2011   surge   in  
Afghanistan  (“clear,  hold,  build,  transfer”),  and  even  the  recent  “pacification”  of  some  of  
Rio  de  Janeiro’s  slums.  
Notwithstanding   the  unique   case   of  MONUSCO,  UN  peacekeeping  missions   are  
far   from   adopting   a   unified   and   coherent   answer   to   the   challenges   facing   peace   and  
Napoleão, Thomaz; Kalil, Mariana. Stabilization as the scuritization of peacebuilding? The experience of Brazil and 








security   around   the  world.  Aware  of   this   shortcoming,   Secretary  General  Ban  Ki-­‐‑moon  
established  a  High  Level  Independent  Panel  on  Peace  Operations  in  October  2014,  under  
the   leadership   of   José   Ramos-­‐‑Horta,   former   President   of   Timor-­‐‑Leste,   with   a   one-­‐‑year  
mandate.  The  Panel  will  review  legal,  political,  military  and  budgetary  issues  concerning  
both  peacekeeping  operations  and  special  political  missions.  Its  recommendations  will  be  
considered  by  the  General  Assembly  at  the  start  of  its  70th  Session,  in  September  2015,  and  
it   is   plausible   that   a   long-­‐‑overdue   definition   of   stabilization   in   the   context   of  
peacekeeping  will  be  among  them.  
Interestingly,  the  only  Brazilian  member  of  the  Panel,  Lieutenant  General  Floriano  
Peixoto   Vieira   Neto,   was   twice   deployed   to   MINUSTAH,   each   time   during   crucial  
junctures:  as  a  Brigade  Operations  Officer  in  the  mission’s  first  year  (2004)  and  as  Force  
Commander   between   2009   and   2010,   a   tour   of   duty   that   included   the   earthquake   that  
devastated  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince  in  January  2010.  
Concurrently   with   the   work   of   the   Ramos-­‐‑Horta   Panel,   in   2015   the   UN   is   also  
promoting   a   ten-­‐‑year   review   of   its   Peacebuilding   Architecture   -­‐‑   comprising   the  
Peacebuilding  Commission   (PBC),   the  Peacebuilding  Fund  (PBF)  and   the  Peacebuilding  
Support  Office  (PBSO)  -­‐‑  with  a  view  to  increasing  its  overall  performance.  The  terms  of  
reference  of  the  Peacebuilding  review  were  proposed  by  Brazil,  as  the  2014-­‐‑2015  Chair  of  
the  PBC.  While  avoiding  the  sensitive  conceptual  debate  on  the  connotations  of  stability,  
the  review  will  inter  alia  "ʺstudy  the  areas  of  potential  complementarity  between  the  PBC  
and  relevant  UN  operational  entities"ʺ,  as  well  as  "ʺthe  emerging  gaps  and  constraints  that  
limit   the   effectiveness   and   ability   of   the   United   Nations   to   prevent   the   recurrence   of  
conflict"ʺ   (Letter   from  the  Permanent  Represent  of  Brazil   to   the  President  of   the  General  
Assembly,  November  4th,  2014).   In  short,  while  the  meaning  of  stabilization  will  not  be  
under   discussion,   the  ways   and  means   to   foster   stability   ("ʺthe   tendency   of   a   state   or   a  
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nation  to  recover  from  perturbations  and  resist  sudden  change  or  deterioration"ʺ,  to  recall  
the  USIP  definition)  in  post-­‐‑conflict  environments  will  be  in  the  spotlight.  
It  should  be  noted  that  the  multilateral  impasse  regarding  the  meaning  of  stability  
and   stabilization   is   not   restricted   to   the   Security   Council   and   other   peacekeeping   and  
peacebuilding   bodies   such   as   the   PBC,   but   also   -­‐‑   and   controversially   -­‐‑   encroaches   on  
other  UN  activities.    
Sustainable  development  is  the  prime  example.  During  the  discussions  on  the  Post-­‐‑
2015  Development  Agenda  and  the  forthcoming  Sustainable  Development  Goals  (SDGs),  
the  General  Assembly  gathered  on  a  thematic  debate  entitled  Ensuring  Stable  and  Peaceful  
Societies   in  April   2014.  The  background  presentation  assumed   that   “peace  and   security,  
development  and  human  rights  are  the  three  pillars  of  the  UN  system  and  foundation  for  
collective   security   and   well-­‐‑being”   (Concept   Note,   Thematic   Debate   of   the   General  
Assembly   “Ensuring   Stable   and   Peaceful   Societies”,   2014).   Panels   debated   the   nexus  
between   sustainable   development,   peace   and   stability;   the   strengthening   of   national  
institutions   as   a   means   for   sustainable   peace;   and   the   role   of   global   awareness   and  
partnerships  to  ensure  stable  and  peaceful  societies  (Background  Note,  Ibid).      
One  of  the  documents  on  which  the  debate  relied  was  People’s  Voices  on  Stability  and  
Peace,   designed  by   the   initiative  The  World  We  Want,   a  global   survey   led  by   the  United  
Nations  that  reached  1.8  million  people  across  the  globe  between  2012  and  2014.  While  no  
clear   definition   of   stability   was   provided,   the   choice   of   indicators   used   to   verify  
consciousness   over   instability   was   revealing   and   thus   worth   quoting:   (a)   a   good  
education  ;  (b)  better  healthcare  ;  (c)  an  honest  and  responsive  government  ;  (d)  better  job  
opportunities  ;  (e)  access  to  clean  water  and  sanitation  ;  (f)  affordable  and  nutritious  food  
;   (g)   protection   against   crime   and   violence   ;   (h)   freedom   from   discrimination   and  
persecution   ;   (i)   support   for   people   who   can’t   work   ;   (j)   protecting   forests,   rivers   and  
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oceans   ;   (k)   better   transport   and   roads   ;   (l)   equality   between   men   and   women   ;   (m)  
political  freedoms  ;  (n)  phone  and  internet  access  ;  (o)  reliable  energy  at  home  ;  (p)  action  
taken  on  climate  change  (People’s  Voices  on  Stability  and  Peace,  2014).  Protection  against  
crime  and  violence  was  highlighted  as  one  of  the  key  concerns  of  the  interviewed  citizens,  
along  with  complaints  over  honest  and  responsible  governments,  better  job  opportunities  
and  freedom  from  discrimination.    
Yet   the  stated  objective  of   the  General  Assembly  debate   ("ʺto  ensure   that  building  
stable   and   peaceful   societies   is   an   essential   part   of   the   international   effort   to   achieve  
sustainable   development"ʺ,   Background   Note,   Ibid)   was   tantamount   to   the   partial  
securitization   of   the   Post-­‐‑2015   Development   Agenda.   A   number   of   industrialized  
countries,   assisted   by   civil   society   organizations   funded  by   them,  proposed   a   strongly-­‐‑
worded  SDG  with  specific  quantitative  objectives  regarding  violence  reduction,  access  to  
justice  and  the  tackling  of  corruption  and  illicit  financial  flows  -­‐‑  all  seen  as  key  elements  
to  build  "ʺstable  societies"ʺ  based  on  a  supposedly  universal  and  inflexible  notion  of  "ʺrule  of  
law"ʺ.  This  move  was   firmly  opposed  by  Brazil  and  other  countries  of   the  Global  South,  
which  argued  that   the  departure  from  a  "ʺrights-­‐‑based  approach"ʺ  toward  a  “rule-­‐‑of-­‐‑law-­‐‑
based   approach”   of   development   would   encourage   the   imposition   of   unjust  
conditionalities   for   development   assistance   and   thus   politicize   the   development  
discourse,   while   blurring   the   fundamental   distinction   between   "ʺconflict"ʺ   (an   issue   of  
international   security)   and   "ʺviolence"ʺ   (a   domestic   affair),   potentially   allowing   a   rather  
oligarchic  decision-­‐‑making  organ  cherry  pick  what   is  and  what   is  not  a   threat   to  peace  
and  security.  Ambassador  Patriota  of  Brazil  questioned  the  "ʺmisperception  according  to  
which   conflict   and   instability   can   only   be   generated   in  weaker   or   poorer   regions"ʺ   and  
reminded   that   peace   and   security   was   not   one   of   the   pillars   of   the   Rio+20   Outcome  
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Document,  which  set  the  parameters  for  the  Post-­‐‑2015  Agenda  (Statement  by  Brazil  and  
Nicaragua  on  VIII  OWG-­‐‑SDGs,  February  2014).  
While   a   specific   SDG   (Objective   16)   on   "ʺpeaceful   and   inclusive   societies"ʺ   was  
eventually  agreed  upon,   the   fact   that   the   lengthy  outline  of   the  Post-­‐‑2015  Development  
Agenda  excludes   the  word  "ʺstability"ʺ  and   its  variants,  and   imposes  no  measurable  goal  
on   peace   and   security,   may   rightly   be   seen   as   a   substantial   achievement   of   Brazilian  
Foreign   Policy   (Report   of   the   Open   Working   Group   of   the   General   Assembly   on  
Sustainable  Development  Goals,  A/68/970).  
  
The  Brazilian  way  
  
Having  discussed   the   international   controversy  on   the  concept  of   stabilization,  we  now  
examine   the   perspective   advocated   by   Brazil   in   the   case   of   Haiti.   In   order   to   verify  
whether  stabilization  in  Haiti  means  essentially  a  securitized  approach  to  the  concept  of  
peacebuilding,   one   must   understand   how   Brazil’s   participation   in  MINUSTAH   differs  
from  conventional  multilateral  practices  regarding  stabilization.  
   The   interviews   conducted   by   the   authors   in   Haiti   reveal   the   widespread   local  
perception,   among   both   Haitian   citizens   and   international   policymakers,   that   Brazil’s  
engagement   in   MINUSTAH   represents   a   juxtaposition   -­‐‑   not   merely   a   sum   -­‐‑   of   the  
concepts  of  hard  and  soft  power.  Far  from  being  perceived  as  agents  of  a  neo-­‐‑colonial  or  
neo-­‐‑imperial  power,  Brazilian  personnel  in  Haiti,  whether  military  or  civilian,  tend  to  be  
respected  even  by   those  who  are  highly  skeptical  over   the   international  presence   in   the  
Caribbean   country.   Mindful   of   its   limitations   but   also   aware   of   its   comparative  
advantages  as  an  international  cooperation  partner,  Brazil  does  not  aim  to  compete  with  
developing  countries   in   terms  of  aid   flows  or  humanitarian  assistance   to  Haiti.   Instead,  
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Brasília   designed   (or   rather   "ʺlearned   by   doing"ʺ)   a   more   progressive   approach   to  
stabilization   that   is   founded   on   a   unique   "ʺsoft/hard"ʺ   formula   for   peacebuilding.   Thus  
Haiti   became   a   "ʺlaboratory   of   multi-­‐‑sector   engagement"ʺ   for   Brazilian   policymakers,   to  
borrow  Waisbich  and  Pomeroy'ʹs   (2014)   expression   -­‐‑  with   the   important   caveat   that   the  
"ʺlaboratory"ʺ  was  not   just  seen  as  a  sandbox  or  a  means  to  achieve  greater  influence,  but  
treated  as  an  end  in  itself.  
Instead   of   the   threat   of   physical   coercion   or   the   imposition   of   governance  
institutions,   peacebuilding   à   la   brésilienne   features   bottom-­‐‑up   and   demand-­‐‑driven  
development   projects;   empowering   public   policies   aimed   at   tackling   poverty;   non-­‐‑
intrusive   support   to   security   sector   reforms,   including   the   training   of   police   officers;   a  
gradually  emerging,  if  still  imperfect,  willingness  to  welcome  a  growing  Haitian  diaspora  
in  Brazil;  and,  above  all,  a  deep  sense  of  respect  for  the  receiving  society  that  results  from  
historical  and  cultural  proximity.  The  importance  of  the  latter  element  in  Haiti,  a  country  
where  resentment  with  past  foreign  interventions  still  runs  high,  cannot  be  overstated.  
Indeed,   former  President   Jean-­‐‑Bertrand  Aristide   (2011),  whose  political   influence  
survives   through   the   resilience  of   the  Lavalas  movement,  blames   the  West,  particularly  
France   and   the   United   States,   for   Haiti’s   social,   economic   and   political   problems   -­‐‑   a  
perspective  not  at  all  uncommon  in  contemporary  Haiti:  
    
All   earthquakes  are   earthquakes/But   there   is  one   that   is  unparalleled   in  
bringing   destruction./   (...)   Sunday   April   4,   2010,   a   powerful  
earthquake/Measuring   7.2   hit  Mexico./Results:   2   people   died,   100   or   so  
were   injured./And   yet   the   earthquake   that   hit  Haiti/  Measured   7.0   and  
caused  nearly  300,000  deaths./   (...)  Colonists  and  new  colonists   consider  
poor   people/   Like   sweet   mangos   that   they   can   suck,   eat   and   throw  
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away./This   is  why   the   foreign   soldiers  who   showed  up   in   2004/And   in  
2010   did   not   come   to   give   the   poor   security./Colonization   is   wrapped  
inside   rosy   speeches,   beautiful   promises/While   weapons   are   there   to  
defend  the  interests  of  the  new  colonists  (Aristide,  2011).  
  
This  mindset   -­‐‑  what  Aristide   calls   "ʺphilosophical   reflections   for  mental   decolonization"ʺ  
and   Braveboy-­‐‑Wagner   (2003)   identifies   as   a   common   trait   between   the   heirs   of   Cold  
War’s   Third  World   thinking   -­‐‑   is   directly   connected   to   the   debate   over   the   concept   of  
stabilization,  as  discussed  among  diplomats  and  scholars.  It  is  no  coincidence  that  Brazil,  
a  country  with  a  complex  international  identity  but  resolutely  and  deliberately  not  seen  as  
a   Western   developed   nation,   usually   escapes   from   being   held   accountable   for   Haiti'ʹs  
hardships,  in  spite  of  a  full  decade  of  military  deployment  and  civilian  presence.    
The  credibility  of  Brazilian  blue-­‐‑helmets  remained  relatively  unscathed  even  after  
incidents   that   seriously   hampered   the   public   image   of   the   United   Nations   in   Haiti,  
notably   the  outbreak  of  cholera   that  was  allegedly   traced   to   the  Nepalese  contingent  of  
MINUSTAH  in  2010.  While  MINUSTAH'ʹs  own  legitimacy  has  been  disputed  by  officials  
who  believe  that  Haiti  simply  does  not  pose  an  international  threat  (Seitenfus,  2010)  and  
authors  that  warn  about  allegations  of  human  rights  abuses  by  UN  troops,  notably  those  
of  Sri  Lanka   (Edmonds  et   alii,   2012),   these   serious   criticisms  were  usually  aimed  at   the  
mission  itself  or  at  other  national  battalions  -­‐‑  not  those  of  Brazil.  
   In   fact,   the   opposite   is   true:   the   public   appeal   of   Brazilian   peacekeepers   never  
waned.   As   interviews   with   UN   political   advisors   in   Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince   suggest,   Brazilian  
conflict   resolution   initiatives   are   seen   by   local   actors   as   a   key   factor   in   the   substantial  
improvement   of   the   security   panorama   in   Haiti   since   2004,   notwithstanding   the   still-­‐‑
ubiquitous  poverty   and   the  political   crises   and  natural   disasters   that   frequently   hit   the  
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country.   Notable   examples   include   grassroots   mediation   activities   implemented   on   a  
daily   basis   by   MINUSTAH   troops   in   Cité   Soleil   and   community   violence   reduction  
programs   enacted   by   NGO   Viva   Rio   in   Bel   Air   (Muggah,   2010).   Meanwhile,   Brasília  
established  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince  as  its  prime  technical  cooperation  partner  and  launched  a  large  
number   of   South-­‐‑South   development   projects   -­‐‑   crucially,   according   to   priorities   set   by  
Government   of   Haiti   -­‐‑   in   areas   such   as   food   security,   sanitation,   rural   development,  
public  health  and  basic  education.  Even   if  not  all  projects  were  successful,   the  Brazilian  
preference   to   support   national   authorities,   instead   of   the   incoherent  multitude   of   civil  
society   organizations   that   made   Haiti   infamous   as   the   "ʺRepublic   of   NGOs"ʺ,   was   and  
remains  highly  appreciated  in  the  country  (ABC,  2010).  
   The  constructive  civilian  and  military  presence  of  Brazil  in  Haiti  is  complemented  
by  a  coherent  diplomatic  discourse  on  the  Caribbean  country'ʹs  immediate  and  long-­‐‑term  
needs:  
Brazil   has   a   long-­‐‑term  commitment   to  Haiti.   The   strengthening  of   State  
institutions  through  capacity-­‐‑building  initiatives  is  a  priority  for  stability  
in   Haiti.   Particularly   relevant   is   the   goal   of   increasing   Haiti'ʹs   National  
Police   capabilities,   the   only   way   to   ensure   perennial   appropriation   of  
security  provision  by  Haitians   themselves.  We   commend  MINUSTAH'ʹs  
work   regarding   the   implementation   of   quick   impact   projects   and  
community  violence  reduction  programs  that  contribute  to  the  mutually  
reinforcing   and   inextricable   objectives   of   stability   and  development.  As  
we   ponder   on   the   lessons   learned   from   our   experience   in   Haiti,   QIPs  
stand  out  as  one  of  the  most  positive  instruments  in  building  a  safe  and  
stable  environment.  (Statement  by  Brazil  at  the  Fourth  Committee  of  the  
UN  General  Assembly,  October  30th  2013)    
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The  dual  emphasis  -­‐‑  stability,  but  also  development  -­‐‑  is  perceived  by  Haiti  as  contrasting  
with   other   international   engagements.   Its   relevance   becomes   ever   more   acute   as  
MINUSTAH   transitions   to   its   final   stage   of   deployment,   since   Security   Council  
Resolution  2180  (2014)  recognized  that  "ʺthe  overall  security  situation  remained  relatively  
stable  with  some  improvement"ʺ  since  2013  and  therefore  decided  to  substantially  reduce  
the  force  contingent.    
The  foremost  element  of  the  exit  strategy  envisaged  for  MINUSTAH  -­‐‑  the  build-­‐‑up  
and    training  of  Haiti’s  National  Police  (PNH)  -­‐‑  recalls  not  only  the  controversy  over  the  
legitimacy  of   the  use  of   force  by  foreigners   in  the  country,  but  also  the  crucial  dilemma  
regarding   the   role   to   be   played   by   the   country'ʹs   national   coercive   institutions.   In   this  
context,  President  Michel  Martelly  has  repeatedly  called  for  the  recreation  of  the  Haitian  
Armed  Forces,  which  were  disbanded  in  the  1990s,  although  the  financial  feasibility  and  
political  consequences  of  such  an  ambitious  endeavor  remains  uncertain.  
This  complex  predicament  leads  back  to  the  conceptual  debate  over  peacebuilding.  
Here,   once   again,   Brazil   highlights   the   imperative   to   build   a   sustainable   peace   that   is  
based   on   the   interdependence   between   security   and   development;   in   this   regard,  
however,   an  approach  of  peacebuilding  based  on   social   inclusion  and   the   resolution  of  
local  conflicts  is  not  just  understood  as  a  preferable  path  to  peace,  but  as  the  only  means  
for   peace.   In   contrast,   even  when   security   sector   reform   is   indispensable   to   enable   the  
receiving  country  to  exercise  the  monopoly  of  the  legitimate  use  of  force,  stabilization  in  
itself   is   only   an   incomplete   step   towards   the   construction   of   a   lasting   peace   in   a  
vulnerable  society.  
Brazil'ʹs  perspective  and  behavior  as  a  peacekeeper  and  peacebuilder  is  influenced  
by   several   factors,   including   the   drive   towards   international   influence   and   power  
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projection   through  multilateral   diplomacy,   the   practice   of   "ʺselective   solidarity"ʺ   and   the  
solid  belief  in  the  need  to  foster  development  worldwide  (Nasser,  2012).  While  believing  
the  Security  Council    should  be  ready  to  deploy  blue  helmets  when  demanded  by  ground  
realities,   Brazil   also   frequently   insists   on   the   fulfilment   of   traditional   requirements   of  
peacekeeping,  such  as  the  voluntary  consent  of  the  parties,  even  when  the  mission  has  a  
multidimensional  profile  and  is  enabled  by  Chapter  VII  of  the  UN  Charter  to  use  force  in  
defense  of  its  mandate.  This  advocacy  can  be  traced  not  only  to  the  country'ʹs  commitment  
to   the   upholding   of   international   law,   but   also   to   the   conciliatory   and   non-­‐‑intrusive  
character  of  Brazil'ʹs  international  identity  and  foreign  policy.  
It  is  therefore  understandable  that  Brazil  sees  local  ownership  -­‐‑  a  central  notion  to  
the  legitimacy  of  all  peacebuilding  ventures  -­‐‑  as  an  indispensable  path  to  the  attainment  
of  a  sustainable  peace.   In  the  context  of  MINUSTAH  nearing  its  drawdown,  this  entails  
strengthening   national   legal   institutions,   chiefly   the   PNH   and   the   judicial   system,   to  
enhance   their   efficiency   and   credibility   among   the   Haitian   population.   Ideally,   such  
initiatives   should   be   reconciled   with   the   need   to   promote   social   development,   post-­‐‑
disaster   reconstruction   and   economic   growth;   in   this   regard,   the   agreement   signed   in  
June  2014  to  enable  the  constitution  of  a  200-­‐‑strong  Haitian  Military  Engineering  Corps,  
to  be  trained  by  the  Brazilian  Army,  is  exemplary.  
As   political   violence   all   too   often   fuels   urban   confrontations   in   the   country,  
particularly  in  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince,  Cap-­‐‑Haïtien  and  Gonaïves,  forging  a  healthier  relationship  
between  local  communities  and  security  agents  is  essential  to  build  a  lasting  peace.  In  the  
case   of  Haiti,   overcoming   cultural   resistances   to   (or   fears   of)   the   police,   as  well   as   the  
common  habit  of  bribing,  might  be  achieved  through  education,  even  if  the  process  could  
take   generation.   Meanwhile,   providing   local   authorities   with   both   the   means   and   the  
incentives   to   preserve   stability   is   key   to   ensuring   a   successful   post-­‐‑MINUSTAH  
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transition,   therefore   guaranteeing   a   stable   environment   and   avoiding   any   relapse   into  
violence.    
  
Towards  a  post-­‐‑stabilization  Haiti  
  
It   could   be   argued   that   to   entertain   the   withdrawal   of   foreign   forces   before   the  
consolidation   of   a   strong   political   tradition   of   state   authority,   under   the   Weberian  
meaning,   might   be   far-­‐‑fetched,   especially   since,   as   Rodrigues   (2010)   points   out,   even  
under  the  most  well-­‐‑accomplished  rule  of  law  shock,  even  within  one’s  own  reflections,  is  
inherent   to   human   existence.   An   apparently   functional   social   contract   would,   thus,  
inexorably  encompass  a  perpetual  state  of   instability.  Notwithstanding,   it   rests   far   from  
consensual   the   legitimacy   of   an   international   military   presence   in   a   country   where  
instability   is   not   a   clear-­‐‑cut   result   of   an   armed   conflict,   and   rather   of   sporadic  mass  or  
restrict   impulse   typical   to   certain   local   political   give-­‐‑and-­‐‑take.   The   highly   sensitive  
political  decision,  to  be  taken  by  the  UN  Security  Council,  to  consider  a  specific  situation  
no   longer   threatening   to   international   peace   and   security,   and   therefore   no   longer  
requiring   a   substantial   international   presence,   may   be   temporarily   postponed,   as   it  
happened  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2010  earthquake  -­‐‑  but  cannot  be  avoided  forever.  With  
careful   planning   and   sufficient   resources,   gradual   transitions   to   sustainable   post-­‐‑
peacekeeping  scenarios  can  be  smooth  and  seamless,  as  the  recent  cases  of  Sierra  Leone  
(post-­‐‑UNAMSIL,   2005)   and   Timor-­‐‑Leste   (post-­‐‑UNMIT,   2012)   confirm.   The   current  
drawdown   of   MINUSTAH,   particularly   following   the   adoption   of   Resolution   2180   in  
2014,  points  in  the  same  direction.    
Nonetheless,  a  careful  approach  to  stabilization  ought  to  realize  that  a  sustainable  
stability  is  a  lot  more  complex  than  the  simple  cease  of  an  explicit  threat  to  international  
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security.  When  the  UNSC’s  perception  of  stability  as  the  end  of  a  threat  to  international  
security  even  though  the  State  is  all  but  developing  leads  to  the  withdrawal  of  troops,  the  
process   of   peacebuilding   is   securitized.   Peace   is   old-­‐‑fashionably   interpreted   as   the  
absence  of  a  threat  to  international  security,  against  all  odds  of  relapse,  and  so  is  left  by  
the  wayside  of  history  a  broader   input  on  the  multidimensional   features  of   the  military  
and   of   peacekeeping   operations,   which   are   both   overwhelming   in   the   case   of   Brazil’s  
Battalion   at  MINUSTAH   –   although   some   of   it  may   result   from  matters   of   the  United  
Nations’  and  the  supporting  States’  budgetary  circumstances.    
While  each  national  context   is  unique,  Haiti  has  the  potential   to   join  the  ranks  of  
developing   countries   where   international   stabilization   as   intrinsic   steps   in   broader  
peacebuilding   efforts   were   mostly   successful.   A   further   development,   possibly   to   be  
reached  in  2016  and  certainly  to  be  welcomed  by  Brazil,  might  be  the  transference  of  the  
situation   in   Haiti   from   the   Security   Council   agenda   to   that   of   the   Peacebuilding  
Commission   after   the   conclusion   of   MINUSTAH.   The   country   would   therefore   still  
receive  international  assistance  towards  the  consolidation  of  its  national  institutions,  the  
empowerment   of   its   citizens   and   the   inclusive   development   of   its   economy,   but   these  
endeavors  would  no  longer  be  framed  by  a  security-­‐‑oriented  standpoint.    
A  successful  post-­‐‑MINUSTAH  transition  in  Haiti  would  not,  in  and  by  itself,  solve  
the  ongoing  diplomatic  and  academic  debate  on   the  practices  and  meanings  of  stability  
and  stabilization.  It  could  nonetheless  prove  that  stabilization,  the  "ʺS"ʺ  of  MINUSTAH,  can  
be   freed   from   the   slippery   logic   of   securitization   and   be   reconciled   with   a   more  
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